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Social Interaction Effects on Reward and Cognitive Abilities in Monkeys
Jeffrey R. Stevens and Marc D. Hauser
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
must discriminate between food and nonfood objects, quantify the amount of food available and its relative value, recall where food is located in the environment as well as the
timing of its seasonal availability, and inhibit the temptation
to take a small, immediately available reward over a larger,
more valuable but delayed reward. Social interactions add
a layer of complexity to these processes, raising questions
about the extent to which individuals can generate expectations about what others want and intend, their competitive
abilities, and the value of a coalitionary partner.
Primates are an ideal group in which to study the comparative cognition of reward processing because they are phylogenetically closely related to humans and because primate species vary in their life histories, mating systems, and foraging
ecologies. Thus, we can not only explore how these different
socioecological parameters uniquely shape each species’ capacity for reward processing but also explore the extent to which
there are more general, derived mechanisms, having evolved
before humans diverged from their phylogenetic ancestors.

Introduction
When given a choice between receiving $100 in 30 days
and $110 in 31 days, most people wait for the larger, more
delayed reward. However, when the choice is between $100
today and $110 tomorrow, many people shift their preferences to the smaller, immediate reward despite the same difference of $10 and one day. Reward properties—such as time
to receipt—play a crucial role in our processing of rewards.
However, reward processing does not only occur for individual decisions but also for social interactions; we must decide
to either cooperate or compete with others for rewards. Humans stand out in the animal kingdom as exceptional cooperators, both in terms of the form that cooperation assumes
as well as the nature of rewards attained. Regarding form,
we are unique in the stability of our reciprocal interactions
and in the scale of our cooperative coalitions, entailing multiple nation states in times of war. In terms of rewards, we
are of course motivated, like all other animals, by the central survival payoffs such as food and water but also by abstract entities such as money, the promise of future support,
and positions of power such as a king, president, or head of
an academic department. To maintain these complicated interactions and evaluate the nature of reward, we must possess a number of prerequisite cognitive abilities. Here, we
view this problem through the lens of evolutionary biology, asking which aspects of our cognitive machinery, and
the social interactions it supports, are uniquely human and
which are shared with other primates. Though we focus on
lemurs, monkeys, and apes, we acknowledge that many of
the processes we document are unlikely to be restricted to
the primates, and in many cases, there is already comparable evidence from other mammals and birds. We begin by reviewing a suite of cognitive mechanisms that are involved in
both human and nonhuman primate reward processing. Our
review is particularly focused on the subset of situations with
quantifiable rewards. We then describe the kinds of social interactions that are part and parcel of primate life, especially
the highly social monkeys and apes. Lastly, we merge these
two sections and consider how constraints on primate cognition may limit the complexity of primate social interactions.

Properties of rewards
For folivorous, frugivorous, and omnivorous primates,
individuals must distinguish between edible and inedible
items, especially given the possibility of ingesting potentially toxic items. For many animals, recognition of edible
foods entails using chemical cues, color patterns, textures,
and shapes. And in some cases, these cues or features are detected in the context of social interactions. For example, in a
study of rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), an experimenter
ate one of two novel food items while a subject watched.
The experimenter then placed new copies of each these food
items on the ground and allowed the subject to approach
and select one. Consistently, subjects picked the food item
eaten by the experimenter. To assess which features mediated response selection, a set of follow-up conditions put
different features into competition, using artificially created
foods. For example, in one condition, the experimenter ate
an orange sphere while holding a blue cube and then presented a blue sphere and an orange cube. Subjects consistently picked the orange cube, showing that in the context
of a social foraging problem, rhesus macaques use color over
shape to identify valuable food.

Primate cognition

Number
To reliably process rewards, animals must be able to quantify reward amounts, either using number or some continuous
dimension of amount such as volume. There are at least two
naturally occurring situations in which number would appear to matter for primates: aggressive competition between
groups and foraging for food. In black howler monkeys (Al-

To set up the problem of reward processing in animals,
we can distinguish between asocial, individually based processes and social ones. The primary difference is whether access to rewards entails competitive or cooperative social interactions or instead can be achieved by an individual on its
own. Some processes operate across asocial and social contexts. For example, an individual seeking food as a reward
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ouatta pigra) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), individuals
attend to the number of competitors. Playback experiments
demonstrate that a group of males is more likely to approach
foreign males if the numerical odds are in their favor. Additionally, in many primate species, two or three individuals
will form coalitions to defeat either a single dominant individual or a smaller coalition. Although these coalitions involve
small numbers, they nonetheless require some capacity to
quantify the number of competitors to acquire rewards such
as mates or foraging areas.
Studies of foraging in animals show that individuals often maximize the rate of energetic returns, choosing patches
with more over less food. Since estimates of rates of return
depend on quantifying amount of food consumed over time,
researchers have asked whether animals count the pieces, estimate the volume, or time the foraging periods in a patch.
For instance, when given the choice between two different amounts of apple slices, rhesus macaques consistently
picked two apples over one, three apples over two and four
apples over three. But when presented with five versus four
apple pieces, some animals picked four and some five. Without training, rhesus monkeys can quantify the number of
pieces of food up to about four but thereafter appear to rely
on a general estimate of amount.
Based on an overwhelming number of carefully controlled
experiments, it is now fair to say that animals have a number sense that likely consists of two naturally available systems. One system allows animals to quantify individuals up
to about four with precision; the second allows them to approximate number but without any limits on magnitude. In
the precise system, as evidenced by the rhesus macaque example, primates are limited to representing four items simultaneously in short-term memory. Human infants and adults
demonstrate a similar limit in a variety of tasks, suggesting
continuity across development and across species. In the approximate system, primates can discriminate between approximate quantities using analog magnitudes, in which performance is limited by the ratio between the quantities and
is independent of absolute value. Other work on operantly
trained rhesus macaques demonstrates that ratio determines
numerical discrimination between quantities ranging from 1
to 30 items. Ratio is important because it suggests that primate
numerical competence conforms to Weber’s law, a psychophysical process in which the accuracy of discriminating different quantities scales with the magnitude of the quantities.
Again, human infants and adults also represent large approximate numbers and show similar signature ratio limits.
Timing
Predicting the timing of reward availability is a critical
capacity for primates. In many species, crucial elements of
the diet are only seasonally available, requiring both timing
and planning. For example, when chimpanzees discover a
source of ripe palm nuts, they not only invest in the processing of these nuts with stone hammers and anvils, but often
leave behind particularly good hammers, retrieving them
on future visits. Studies conducted with captive apes reveal that they can recall the kinds of tools needed for certain
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tasks, and retrieve them in the service of planning for future
tasks. Based on their patterns of movement, it is also clear
that many primates store information about fruiting cycles,
enabling them to time the optimum period of visitation and
harvesting.
Like number, the capacity to time events is based on a
mechanism that, both behaviorally and neurobiologically,
shows the signature of the analog magnitude system that
underlies number. Importantly, timing exhibits the scalar property of Weber’s law: the variance of timing accuracy scales with interval magnitude and is therefore a function of the ratio between magnitudes. For instance, rhesus
macaques showed similar accuracy levels between timing
events with a 1:1.5 ratio, regardless of whether the discrimination was 4 s vs. 6 s, 6 s vs. 9 s, 8 s vs. 12 s, or 10 s vs. 15 s.
Unfortunately, little work has explored primate timing abilities beyond a few seconds, with the exception of periodic
timing of circadian cycles. Moreover, the work is largely restricted to studies involving operant training, with no work
on the relationship between timing and the role of social or
ecological contexts.
Impulsivity
Animals must often combine quantity and temporal information to choose between rewards available over different
time intervals (intertemporal choice). For example, imagine a
monkey encounters a tree full of unripe fruit and with only
a few ripe fruit: should it spend the time and energy to consume the few ripe fruit now or wait for the rest to ripen? Waiting would yield a higher reward amount, but the future is uncertain—another monkey may eat the fruit in the meantime,
winds may knock them into a stream below, a fungus may infest and spoil the perfectly good fruit. This uncertainty may
have provided a strong adaptive benefit for impulsivity.
Decision makers can make intertemporal choices by
means of at least two mechanisms. The first mechanism simply assumes that the forager maximizes its food intake rate
over repeated foraging bouts. This rate maximization account predicts that foragers should maximize the total energy gained from rewards over the total time spent acquiring and processing the rewards. Evidence from operant
experiments suggests that cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) may use
rate maximization strategies when trading off future benefits. Temporal discounting represents the second mechanism
and involves the subjective devaluation of future rewards.
If animals discount the future (as the example in the introduction implied), delayed rewards are less valuable than immediate rewards, potentially resulting in impulsive choice.
In experiments that estimate discounting levels, subjects are
presented with two stimuli: one associated with a small, immediate reward and the other with a large, delayed reward.
The discounting level is “titrated” by incrementally increasing the delay-to-large until subjects are indifferent between
choosing the large delayed reward and the small, immediate
reward. Therefore, researchers can find indifference points
between immediate and delayed rewards over a range of
small and large reward amounts. Psychologists have exten-
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sively studied discounting in rats and pigeons, but fewer
studies have investigated primate discounting. Surprisingly,
the handful of primate discounting studies that have been
conducted demonstrate that cotton-top tamarins, common
marmosets, brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), and
rhesus macaques show similar discounting levels to rats and
pigeons, devaluing rewards up to 50% in the first four seconds of delay!
The high levels of discounting observed for most nonhuman animals suggests that when rewards are distributed
over time, individuals place a premium on immediacy, forgoing delayed rewards. This not only puts severe constraints
on the foraging strategies of monkeys and apes, but constrains other behaviors such as cooperation, territory defense, and mate selection.
Inhibitory control
Inhibiting prepotent responses to reward is a difficult
task for nonhuman animals. Clearly, natural selection has favored a strong drive to obtain the largest reward available.
This is evidenced by the performance of a number of primate species on the reversed-contingency task in which subjects must reach toward the smaller of two visible rewards to
receive the larger reward. Brown and black lemurs (Eulemur
fulvus and E. macaco), tamarins, squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus), rhesus macaques, orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), bonobos, and chimpanzees all invariably
choose the large reward, only to receive the small reward—
they seem incapable of controlling their desire to reach for
the larger reward amount.
The reversed-contingency task has proven difficult for
primates to solve but not impossible. A number of techniques can circumvent the inhibitory control problem. First,
sheer repetition can allow subjects to choose the smaller
and receive the larger food reward. Most subjects do not
solve the task after 200 trials, though some are at chance
rather than repeatedly choosing the smaller amount. After
400-2500 trials, however, six rhesus macaques received the
larger reward in over 90% of trials. Thus, massive exposure
to the reversed contingencies can eventually trump the inhibitory problems. Second, imposing costs for “incorrect”
choice can facilitate receiving the larger reward. By withholding all food when subjects pick the larger quantity, macaques and squirrel monkeys eventually learn to pick the
smaller quantity; tamarins stick with the losing strategy,
picking the larger and getting nothing at all. This suggests
that part of the failure to point to the smaller quantity is due
to the lack of costs associated with pointing to the larger
quantity. Finally, including a mediator between seeing the
food and receiving the food can curb the impulse to choose
the larger reward amount. This has been most noticeably
documented by an experiment testing chimpanzees trained
on the Arabic number symbols from 1-6. Instead of choosing between one food treat versus four treats, the chimpanzees chose between a card with the numeral 1 written on its
face and a card with the numeral 4; each card covered up
the corresponding number of food treats. The chimpanzees
quickly learned to pick the number 1 card and received 4
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treats, indicating chimpanzees can learn a rule like “Point
to the one you don’t want to get the one you want”. Surprisingly, once they learned this rule with symbols, they were
incapable of generalizing to the same problem with food
presented on its own. Therefore, it seems as though the difficulty of this task results from the chimpanzees’ strong motivation to reach for food rather than an inability to learn the
reverse-contingency rule.
Memory
Memory is a multi-faceted cognitive ability with clear
evolutionary importance. Researchers have delineated several different types of memory that are applied to different
types of information. Here we will focus on three types of
memory: short-term, spatial, and episodic memory. One of
the simplest tasks used to test short-term memory is the delayed-response task. In this task, a reward is placed under
one of two (or more) identical but spatially separated stimuli. After a retention interval, subjects are allowed to chose
one of the stimuli and receive the rewards if correct. Comparative data show that rhesus macaques are fairly good
at remembering the location of the food item. They begin
with about 80% accuracy after only a few seconds and drop
to about 68% accuracy after a 15 second retention interval.
Marmosets, however, though also starting at 80% accuracy,
drop to 58% accuracy at 15 seconds, only slightly better than
chance. Though some evidence suggests that the Old World
monkeys may retain information better than the New World
monkeys, this is by no means a universal, with capuchin
monkeys being a notable exception to the rule.
Spatial memory plays an important role in primate reward acquisition. Recalling when and where food rewards
are distributed is critical in foraging situations. In fact,
some have suggested that foraging problems have posed
strong evolutionary pressures on primate cognition, with
species that feed on spatially and temporally variable foods
showing higher levels of brain encephalization than species
that feed on more stable food sources. Numerous studies
have demonstrated strong spatial skills in primates, particularly in analogs to the radial arm maze. In this task, feeder
stations placed throughout an enclosure are baited before
subjects enter. After a subject finds all of the stations, researchers bait only some of the stations and, following a retention interval, record whether the subjects first attempt to
feed at the previously baited stations. Most of the experiments on primates show high accuracy over retention intervals as long as 24 hours. As predicted by the adaptive
specialization hypothesis, species that search over longer distances for food in the wild tend to be more accurate at longer retention intervals (e.g., frugivorous golden
lion tamarins [Leontopithecus rosalia] are more accurate than
gummivorous Wied’s marmosets [Callithrix kulhi]). Additionally, the contingency between space and reward plays
an important role. Common marmosets, for instance, are
more accurate in a win-stay paradigm in which previous
food locations predict current locations than in a win-shift
paradigm in which subjects are not rewarded for visiting
previously visited food stations.
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Probably one of the most interesting and controversial
areas of primate memory is episodic memory. There is a
feisty debate in the literature about whether nonhuman animals have the ability to mentally travel in time to recall previous experiences. The benchmark requirements for demonstrating episodic memory include showing that animals
know “what,” “where,” and “when” an experience occurred.
Though this is difficult to study in nonlinguistic creatures,
recent research provides suggestive evidence of episodiclike memory in corvids and primates. For example, up to 24
hours after receiving a particular food item from an experimenter, a gorilla correctly identified the food type received
and the experimenter from which he received it.
Theory of mind
Another highly contentious area of primate cognition is
theory of mind. As mentioned earlier, this aspect of primate
cognition is not strictly about reward. Yet, the capacity to
make inferences about what others know, desire, believe and
intend often leads directly to cooperative and competitive rewards, and most of the experimental studies use food as motivator to explore these mental states.
Early studies failed to find evidence of theory of mind
in primates. One explanation for these failures was that
the studies relied on animals making inferences about human mental states in contexts involving cooperation, as opposed to asking animals to make inferences about each other
in the context of competition. Though several primate species do cooperate (see below), competition is far more common and may represent the most basic form of social interaction among animals. To test this hypothesis, recent studies
of monkeys and apes have used both competitive and cooperative tasks, contrasting conspecific pairing as well as conspecific-heterospecific pairings. There is increasing evidence
that monkeys and apes make inferences from seeing to
knowing. Chimpanzees, for instance, can take the visual perspective of other individuals to understand whether they can
see occluded food rewards: subordinate chimpanzees preferentially approach rewards that are obscured from the view
of dominant individuals. Rhesus monkeys show similar abilities, stealing food primarily from experimenters without visual access to the food rather than from those that do have
access. Though visual perspective taking is only one component of having a theory of mind, it plays a significant role
in the competitive and cooperative interactions of primates.
What remains to be explored is whether primates go beyond
this elemental capacity, attributing intentions, desires, and
beliefs to others.
Primate social interactions
In socially living animals, such as some of the lemurs and
most monkeys and apes, obtaining rewards is often coupled with socially competitive or cooperative interactions.
In some instances, helping another individual yields payoffs for the helper, while in other cases, helping is costly for
the helper. The existence of the latter poses a puzzle given
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the generally accepted Darwinian assumption that behavior
evolves via natural selection to provide fitness benefits to the
individual. Specifically, what selective pressure has favored
individuals who provide benefits to other individuals?
Here, we address the evolution of cooperation by describing four different models (mutualism, kin selection, reciprocity, and punishment), focusing on evidence from monkeys
and apes. We operationally define cooperation as social interactions resulting in a net benefit for all participants; here,
benefit is measured in terms of increasing reproductive
success.
Mutualism
The simplest type of cooperative behavior provides direct
benefits to the cooperator, in addition to other individuals.
Therefore, benefits to others are by-products of benefits to
self. This model of cooperative behavior is termed by-product mutualism. Any individual that defects (does not cooperate) in mutualistic situations will, by definition, do worse
than a cooperator; therefore, in the absence of a temptation
to defect, cooperation provides the best option. Importantly,
mutualism does not depend on the identity of one’s partner
and thus can occur between any members of the same species and even members of different species.
Mutualism is a common form of cooperation, with cooperative hunting providing a prime example. When multiple
individuals cooperate to hunt the same prey, they can both
increase the probability of successful prey capture and reduce the individual costs associated with hunting. Cooperative hunting provides mutualistic benefits only when the
per capita intake rate increases with group size. Therefore,
a pair of hunters would have to capture more than twice as
many prey items as a solitary hunter. This typically requires
the success rate of solitary hunters to be fairly low, making
cooperation particularly successful. Increased success combined with lower hunting costs can lead to direct, immediate, and simultaneous fitness benefits for cooperative hunters, particularly when hunting small or difficult prey. For
example, wild chimpanzees often cooperatively hunt arboreal monkeys. Although different populations vary, there is
evidence that in some populations the per capita intake rate
increases with group size, suggesting that the hunting is cooperative. Cheaters that do not hunt are discouraged by receiving only small amounts of meat in food sharing bouts
following a kill. Thus, it is in an individual’s best interest to
participate in a hunt to acquire the much sought-after meat.
In the laboratory, mutualism has been documented in a
variety of primates including marmosets, capuchin monkeys, and chimpanzees. Typically, when joint action is required to receive separate benefits for each player, subjects
succeed in cooperating. However, when food is monopolizable instead of divided between players, cooperation breaks
down. That is, when immediate rewards are available, primates cooperate. But once competition reduces the probability of reward, there is no guarantee of immediate benefit
and no apparent mechanism capable of maintaining cooperation. In a recent study of captive chimpanzees, individuals
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confronted an opportunity to manipulate an apparatus for a
food reward; on some trials, the focal subject had to recruit
the help of another individual in order to manipulate the apparatus and on other trials, the focal could operate the apparatus alone. Subjects only recruited help when two individuals were required to obtain the food reward. Moreover,
in a second experiment, subjects selectively recruited effective helpers over ineffective helpers, demonstrating a keen
knowledge of the role of others in the mutualistic acquisition
of rewards.
Kin selection
Whereas mutualism poses no problem for classic Darwinian theory, altruistic cooperation does as the actor incurs a
cost while benefiting another. Kin selection provided the first
clear theoretical solution to the paradox of altruism. Individuals may bias cooperation toward their genetic relatives because it helps propagate their own genes shared by common
descent. What looks altruistic from an individual’s perspective actually serves self-interest from the gene’s view. Individuals have a certain probability of sharing a gene (r—the
coefficient of relatedness) with relatives due to common descent. If the benefits to kin discounted by this coefficient of
relatedness outweigh the costs of helping, altruism towards
kin can evolve.
Kin selection may be particularly powerful in primates
because of the close-knit family groups found in many species. With a few notable exceptions, including chimpanzees,
nonhuman primates follow the general mammalian pattern of philopatry in which males leave their natal groups
upon reaching reproductive maturity whereas females stay
in their natal groups for life; consequently, most primate
groups consist of closely related female kin and genetically
unrelated males. Kin selection theory predicts that individuals should preferentially help relatives and should help in
proportion to their coefficient of relatedness. These types of
quantitative predictions have proven difficult to test in primates, but there are data showing kin-directed helping, particularly in coalition formation and food sharing.
Primates frequently form coalitions in which multiple
individuals form an alliance in agonistic interactions with
other group members. This is particularly prevalent in primate species with matrilineal dominance hierarchies, such
as macaques and baboons. In these species, females often
assist relatives in aggressive encounters with other group
members. Notably, the probability of coalitionary support
tapers off with increasingly distantly related kin: mothers
almost always aid offspring but are less likely to aid nieces
and nephews. Therefore, as relatedness increases, these primates are more likely to pay costs associated with helping
kin. Additionally, individuals are more likely to form coalitions with kin than nonkin against higher-ranking opponents, suggesting that they will pay a higher cost of helping
related individuals. Male primates can also form coalitions,
often to guard or acquire sexually receptive females. In situations in which few mating opportunities exist for males,
these kin-based coalitions are especially relevant because
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aiding kin helps ensure the propagation of one’s genes,
even in the absence of direct mating opportunities. This is
the case in red howler monkeys (Alouatta seniculus) where
coalitions of related individuals have longer tenure in a
troop (and therefore more mating opportunities) than unrelated individuals. Though many instances of coalitionary support are directed to kin, some are directed to nonkin
and may be attributable to other benefits such as mutualism and reciprocity.
One of the most often-reported examples of apparent altruism is food sharing—voluntarily allowing another to
consume food that one individual possesses. Food sharing
is, of course, very common between mother and offspring
for numerous primate species. However, it also occurs between grandparents and grandoffspring, siblings, and
even adult relatives, often scaling with relatedness. In captive macaques, for instance, mother-daughter pairs (r = 0.5)
frequently fed from the same food bin. Both grandmothergranddaughter pairs and sister-sister pairs (r = 0.25) co-fed
at intermediate rates, and aunt-niece pairs (r = 0.125) co-fed
at low levels indistinguishable from unrelated pairs. Though
it is unclear what proportion of food transfers occur between
relatives, kin-based sharing likely explains the bulk of sharing in numerous species.
Reciprocity
Reciprocity occurs when an individual pays a short-term
cost of cooperation for the future benefit of a social partner’s reciprocated cooperation. As a form of altruistic cooperation, reciprocity aims to explain cooperative behavior
among genetically unrelated individuals (thereby eliminating kin selection as an explanation) in a unique type of social interaction termed the prisoner’s dilemma. The keys
aspects of the prisoner’s dilemma are: 1) cooperation maximizes the total payoff to everyone involved in the interaction (mutual cooperation provides more benefits than mutual defection); however, 2) any individual will receive a
higher personal payoff by defecting, so a sizable temptation
to cheat exists. Pursuing unilateral cooperation in this game
is not a stable strategy.
Theoreticians suggested that reversing roles as donor and
recipient of altruism may reduce the temptation to defect because it largely commits individuals to invest in future cooperation. When the fitness payoffs sum over a series of interactions with the same partner, reciprocal strategists can
reap the benefits of mutual cooperation. The reciprocal strategy tit-for- tat, in which a player starts out cooperating and
copies its opponent’s behavior in previous interactions, can
successfully invade and dominate simulated populations of
social partners engaging in prisoner’s dilemma games, winning out over many alternative behavioral strategies. If the
probability of interacting again exceeds a critical level, a reciprocal strategy can maintain cooperation.
Many authors have reported examples of reciprocity
in animals, including primates, spanning such contexts as
food sharing, grooming, and coalitions associated with mating opportunities. Unfortunately, in most cases these pur-
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ported examples of reciprocity have either never been replicated or have been challenged by alternative explanations
for the patterns of interaction, including especially kin selection and mutualism. Another alternative explanation, symmetry-based reciprocity, occurs when the reciprocal pattern
can be explained by the symmetrical relationship between
individuals. For instance, if individuals A and B interact frequently and cooperate, their behavior will appear to be reciprocal even though it is based on symmetrical interactions
rather than contingent cooperation. This contrasts with calculated reciprocity (such as tit-for-tat) in which individuals
track debts owed and favors given when deciding whether
to cooperate.
A field study of olive baboons (Papio anubis) provided
one of the first reports of reciprocity. Males formed coalitions in order to drive off rival males and gain access to reproductively active females. Data suggested that males took
turns reaping the benefits, implying evidence of reciprocity. The robustness of this finding, however, is unclear given
that a subsequent study of a different population of baboons
did not find the same reciprocal patterns and a study of a
closely related species proposed an alternative, mutualistic
explanation.
Another example comes from experimental tests of food
sharing in captive capuchin monkeys. When pairs of capuchins were placed in adjacent chambers separated by a mesh
partition, if individual A allowed individual B to consume
dropped scraps of food in one particular trial, then B tended
to allow A to gather scraps in the next trial. Because the food
transfer is primarily passive and costs may be minimal, these
results can be explained by a mutual tolerance between individuals. Therefore, the capuchins do not appear to be assessing the costs and benefits of their actions, making calculated reciprocity an unlikely explanation of capuchin food
transfers.
Lastly, in a series of experiments with captive cottontop
tamarins, subjects could pull a tool to give food to an unrelated recipient without getting any food for self. Tamarins
pulled the tool most often for partners that always pulled
and infrequently for partners that never pulled. The frequency of cooperation was, however, less than 50%, and as
each game progressed, the amount of food given dropped.
Tamarins, therefore, maintained moderate levels of cooperation with other cooperators, but the degradation of cooperation over time suggests an unstable system; in fact,
game theoretic modeling of the data suggest that reciprocity crashes if an opponent fails to cooperate on two consecutive opportunities.
In summary, there are few examples of true, calculated
reciprocity among monkeys and apes. Most putative examples can be explained by symmetry-based reciprocity, mutualism, or kin selection. Given the simplicity of the preconditions for reciprocity and the apparent ubiquity of reciprocity
in humans, it’s rarity in primates (and other animals) is surprising. We take up this issue in the section on cognitive constraints on reward processing.
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Punishment
Punishing individuals that defect can potentially impose
enough costs to offset the temptation to cheat and, like reciprocity, can elicit future cooperation. Punishment involves
energetic costs and, when accomplished by means of aggression, also involves the costs of risked injury. Consequently,
as an adaptive behavior, punishment is a selfish strategy, favoring actions that ultimately benefit the punisher by eliciting cooperative behavior from the recipient of punishment.
As defined, punishment resembles reciprocity, which should
occur when it elicits cooperative behavior directed strictly at
the reciprocator. Despite the theoretical interest, punishment
is not well-documented in animals; in fact, though animals
act aggressively toward others in the context of resource defense (e.g., territoriality, dominance interactions), there are
few examples in the context of cooperation.
Whereas punishment penalizes past behavior with the
hope of future reward, a similar behavior called harassment
penalizes present behavior to elicit immediate reward. Harassment occurs when an individual imposes costs such as aggression on another to induce immediate cooperation, thereby
providing instant benefits to the harasser. Harassment may
also influence future as well as current cooperation, suggesting that it can lead to punishment strategies. For instance, if
a defector is in the process of consuming an entire food resource, a harasser could impose costs on the defector aimed
at obtaining some portion of the food resource immediately.
Whereas punishment appears relatively rare among animals,
harassment may be more common. For instance, after capturing prey, chimpanzees frequently allow other individuals to
consume part of the meat. Observational work has demonstrated that harassment best accounts for the pattern of food
sharing, taking the form of individuals incessantly begging
for food with hand gestures, grabbing at the food, and placing their hands over the mouths of the food possessors. In this
context, harassment was costly for the food owner (food intake rate decreased as the number of beggars increased), owners shared more often when beggars harassed frequently and
intensely, and when sharing occurred harassment levels decreased. Controlled experiments corroborated these findings
with captive chimpanzees, as well as squirrel monkeys (Saimiri boliviensis), a species that rarely cooperates.
Harassment may, of course, influence future as well as
current cooperation, suggesting that it may lead to punishment strategies. One example comes from rhesus macaques.
When individuals find food, they often give food calls, an
altruistic act that recruits others to the food source, thereby
potentially benefiting kin. However, individuals sometimes find food and suppress their calls. If no one detects
these silent discoverers, they reap more food rewards than
those who announce their discoveries. If, in contrast, they
are detected, then they are aggressively attacked, leading
to an even larger loss of food to the attacker. Thus, aggression yields an immediate benefit of accessing food for the attacker, clearly qualifying it as a case of harassment. In addition, the aggression may have a punishing effect on silence
by eliciting future food calls. That is, aggressive behavior influences both immediate and future benefits.
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The cognitive psychology of a cooperator
Many researchers have argued that the frequency of complex social interactions in primates underlies the evolution
of their cognitive abilities. Negotiating a complicated network of allies and enemies, dominants and subordinates,
and mates and competitors has created selective pressure
for cognitive abilities such as transitive inference, theory of
mind, and deception. Though this connection between sociality and cognition has been well recognized, the cognitive
constraints on social interaction have often been ignored. Put
simply, much of the work on primate cognition has focused
on how large brains enable rich social interactions instead
of how limited cognitive abilities may constrain the range
of social interactions. Here, we take up this “cognitive constraints” perspective.
Mutualism and kin selection are both theoretically
well-understood and empirically well-documented models of cooperation. By contrast, reciprocity and punishment, while theoretically feasible, are rare among primates
(although harassment may be more widespread). Therefore, despite models purporting the evolutionary stability
of all of these types of cooperation, some types occur much
more frequently than others. Unfortunately, a strictly adaptive perspective has limited power to explain the frequency
of mutualism and kin-biased cooperation and the rarity of
reciprocity and punishment. A proximate perspective that
links with the ultimate problem can, however, reveal how
cognitive constraints limit or facilitate particular forms of
cooperation.
The proximate approach emphasizes critical aspects of
reciprocity and punishment that differ markedly from mutualism and kin-biased cooperation. In both reciprocity and
punishment, the fitness benefits associated with cooperation depend on the partner’s behavior: cooperation should
only occur when the partner responds by reciprocating or
punishing. When this contingent response occurs in the future, the temporal delay introduces cognitive challenges that
may constrain the emergence and stability of cooperation.
Animals can easily implement strategies that yield immediate benefits, such as mutualism and harassment, because
individuals do not have to track benefits over time. With a
time delay between cooperating and receiving return benefits, however, individuals must invest in an uncertain future.
Delayed benefits impede learning the consequences of cooperation, place greater demands on the capacity to recall previous interactions, and trade off short-term fitness gains for
long-term gains. Here we highlight how several key cognitive constraints play a role in mutualism, kin-biased cooperation, reciprocity, and punishment, thereby uniting the two
sections of this essay.
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Cognitive constraints on mutualism and kin-biased
cooperation
Because no temptation to cheat exists in mutualistic interactions, individuals should always cooperate. As a result, mutualism requires no special cognitive abilities above
and beyond the challenges inherent in the cooperative behavior itself. Kin-biased cooperation does, however, require additional cognitive capacities. At a minimum, it requires the capacity to direct cooperative actions to related
individuals.
Mechanisms of kin recognition include recognition alleles, phenotype matching, and spatial and familiarity cues.
The recognition allele hypothesis predicts that individuals
can compare a particular phenotypic cue (auditory, olfactory, visual, etc.) to an innately specified template. Such a
model requires few cognitive skills other than discriminating the cue associated with relatedness. The closely related
phenomenon of phenotypic matching occurs when an individual compares a conspecific’s phenotypic cues to a learned
template. This requires specialized perceptual and computational systems that detect cues at an early stage to form a
template, then test cues against the template to discriminate
kin. Though recognition alleles and phenotypic matching
provide the most direct forms of kin recognition and have
been observed in some animal species, they do not appear to
be common mechanisms of primate kin recognition. Instead,
primates seem to use a simple set of rules such as spatial and
familiarity cues to discriminate kin. Often primates may use
rules such as “be nice to individuals near your home” or
“help those that you grew up with” to direct the benefits of
cooperation towards kin. These familiarity mechanisms require little in the way of cognitive abilities, building on general laws of learning by association, and seem to be widespread throughout the primates.
Cognitive constraints on reciprocity and punishment
The original formulation of reciprocity had three requirements for evolutionary stability: 1) the reciprocated benefit
must outweigh the immediate cost, 2) individuals must interact repeatedly, and 3) individuals must recognize each
other. These requirements, however, most likely underestimate what is cognitively necessary for both developing and
maintaining a system of stable reciprocity. In particular, the
delay between the cost of a cooperative act and the benefit of reciprocated cooperation introduces a number of cognitive challenges. Like reciprocity, punishment can involve
a delay between a costly act and a beneficial payoff, and in
these cases it faces similar constraints. For this reason, we
consider the constraints on reciprocity and punishment together, pointing to differences where appropriate.
Individual recognition—Like kin selection, reciprocity and
punishment require directing cooperation to others. Unlike kin selection, however, where altruistic acts are disseminated simply as a function of coefficients of genetic relatedness, reciprocity and punishment require targeting specific
individuals. Therefore, the delayed, contingent response re-
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quired for both reciprocity and punishment necessitates that
individuals can distinguish different partners. Mechanisms
for individual recognition appear to be the norm among animals, including lemurs, monkeys, and apes. Consequently,
the paucity of evidence for reciprocity and punishment
across primates cannot appeal to individual recognition as a
constraint.
Number, amount and time—Numerical abilities can play
a key role in reciprocity when individuals must precisely
quantify the reward amounts being reciprocated. When primates engage in a bout of reciprocity, they will either be limited to small numbers of objects in cases where the exchange
must be precise (a banana for a banana), or they will be freed
from this constraint where approximate exchanges are tolerated. The same prediction holds for cases where the currency
is time, such as the duration of a grooming bout. If one monkey grooms another for 10 minutes, the groomer will most
likely accept as fair exchange a reciprocated grooming bout
of between 8-12 minutes. As reward quantity and time magnitudes increase, quantification accuracy decreases, making
equitable exchange more difficult and leaving opportunities
for cheaters to exploit the judgment errors. This constraint
only applies when variance exists in the quantity and time
magnitudes. If the exchange is always a banana for a banana,
these quantification abilities are superfluous.
Inhibitory control and impulsivity—Reciprocity is itself an
inhibitory and impulsivity problem: can an individual inhibit the choice of the immediate large benefit to gain the delayed larger benefit? Like the reversed-contingency task, the
chooser must first reach for the undesirable over the desirable reward. The first move can be likened to giving away
food. By avoiding the temptation of the larger immediate reward, the first move is costly to self. As data on the reversedcontingency task in primates show, the cost often appears
too great and the inhibitory system too weak.
The second move, waiting for the reciprocated benefit, is
analogous to the intertemporal choices described earlier. Individuals must choose between the immediate reward of defecting and the long-term reward of cooperating. Indeed, a
number of researchers have predicted that impulsivity can
reduce the value of reciprocated benefits. Experimental data
on variation in human impulsivity and cooperation validate
the view that a preference for immediate rewards may inhibit reciprocity. Impulsivity correlates with cooperation
such that individuals who prefer immediate gains also cooperate less frequently. In parallel, blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) show stable cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma only
following an experimental reduction in their preference for
immediacy. Although primates have not been tested in both
impulsivity and cooperation tasks, it seems highly probable
that a significant constraint on their capacity for reciprocity
emerges from their steep discounting functions. Similar abilities are required for punishment: punishers must pay an immediate cost of punishing to achieve a future, discounted
reward.
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Memory—Episodic memory may very well be required to
implement reciprocity. Because individuals must track the
actions (“what”) of previous partners (“who”) the last time
that they interacted (“when”), fairly sophisticated memory
systems may be required for reciprocity. Even if episodic
memory itself is not required, limitations in memory decay,
interference, and capacity can also constrain the frequency of
reciprocity and punishment. Memory decay proceeds rapidly over time; therefore, longer time intervals between cooperative acts may make reciprocity and punishment more
difficult. Even with short time delays between cooperative
interactions and few distractions, every potential new partner increases the computational load of tracking debts owed,
favors given, and costs imposed. Keeping score of reciprocal obligations and punishment with the extensive social network found in many primate species may place a computationally intensive burden on memory systems. Although few
studies examine learning and memory constraints in primate cooperation, studies of human cooperation suggest that
these constraints can pose challenges for maintaining stable
cooperative relationships.
Theory of mind—Understanding the knowledge of others is
critical to strategic reasoning. “I know that you know that I
know that you know…” is a central assumption of economic
decision making required for rational agents to solve economic games. If, however, natural selection acts as the “rational agent” by selecting for individuals that make good decisions, this capacity may not be required for individuals if
they use simple rules that approximate the outcome of fully
rational choice. Therefore, it is possible for primates to implement reciprocity without full theory of mind capacities.
At present, only a few studies have attempted in integrate issues concerning mental state attribution with those involved
in cooperation. For example, recent demonstrations of visual
perspective taking abilities in primates suggests that they
might be able to attend to rewards that others seek, possibly
aiding their ability to recognize cooperative situations. However, despite this evidence, recent work shows that chimpanzees do not demonstrate other-regarding preferences; that
is, they do not preferentially acquire food rewards in such
a way as to give food to others. Instead, they appear to be
completely indifferent to how their own reward-based actions can benefit other individuals. In contrast, in the study
of tamarins mentioned above, individuals were more likely
to cooperate with individuals who intentionally gave food
as an altruistic act as opposed to individuals who gave the
same amount of food as an accidental by-product of an otherwise selfish act. Further study of what monkeys and apes
understand of the goals, beliefs, and intentions of others will
elucidate whether limitations in these areas constrain otherregarding preferences.

Conclusions
With increasingly sophisticated and ecologically relevant
tasks, we are closing in on those aspects of reward process-
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ing and social cognition that have uniquely evolved in humans and those that evolved by common descent with other
primates, and possibly, other nonprimate animals. We suggest reward processing and social cognition are intimately
linked, setting up cognitive constraints on the evolution of
cooperative behavior. We do not propose that these reward
processing constraints are immutable. If the evolutionary
benefit of cooperation is great, selection pressure may circumvent these constraints. This, however, is likely to occur
in a domain-specific manner rather than a domain-general
manner. For instance, food caching species such as squirrels may suspend inhibitory and impulsivity problems when
hiding nuts away for winter. Yet, this ability has evolved
to solve a very specific problem and likely does not apply
generally to the species’ decision-making strategies. Therefore, domain-general cognitive systems must evolve to allow
many of the more complex forms of cooperation. The possibly unique presence of reciprocal cooperation and punishment in humans may be directly attributable to a combination of our keen number sense, patience, inhibitory control,
memory capacity, and theory of mind.
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